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The Regime Changes in Tunisia and Egypt
: A Comparison with the Regime Change in Indonesia
Ayako MASUHARA
This paper analyses the regime changes in Tunisia and Egypt in January and
February 2011, comparing them with the regime change in Indonesia in May
1998.
For a long time, many researchers considered that regime change and
democratization would not occur in Middle Eastern and North African countries.
However, since the beginning of 201 1, civil anti-governmental demonstrations
have shaken the authoritarian regimes in these countries. In Tunisia and Egypt,
the authoritarian regimes have been overthrown by such anti-governmental
movements.
A few years ago, I explained the collapse of the Suharto regime in Indonesia
in 1998. In this paper,, I examine similarities and differences between the regime
changes in lndonesia… Tunisia and Egypt.
Firstly, the structure of the Suharto regime in Indonesia, the Ben AH regime
in Tunisia and the Mubarak regime in Egypt were very similar because political
power and wealth were concentrated on the president and his family. The huge
governmental party and the military, which were given patronage (various posts
in the parliament and the government) by the president. eagerly supported
him. Secondly, anti-governmental movements of the ordinary people in these
countries did not have an organization or leadership. Using IT tools like mobile-
phones and the Internet, they come together in order to demonstrate, as a kind
of network. Thirdly, like the regime change in Indonesia, the dictatorships of Ben
Ali and Mubarak ended peacefully after the demonstrations. There was no civil
war as occurred in Libya and no bloody suppression as has taken place in Syria.
After the collapse of the dictatorships, these countries followed different
roads. In Indonesia, the former governmental party formed a new government in
cooperation with the opposition groups and promoted democratization together
with them. In Tunisia, the opposition groups expelled former governmental party
members from the new government and promoted democratization themselves.
In Egypt, the military which held power after President Mubarak resigned,
formed a military supreme board instead of a government and advanced
democratization in cooperation with the opposition groups.
What factor caused the differences in these countries? It was the relations
between the governmental party, the military and the peopie in each country
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before the collapse of the authoritarian regime. In Indonesia, the governmental
party was divided into hard-liners and soft-liners in the process of the regime
change, and as the soft-liners cooperated with the opposition groups they were
permitted to participate in the new government. In Tunisia, however, people
were angry with the governmental party because they had eagerly supported
the Habib Bourguiba and Ben Ali dictatorships for 55 years, and party members
did not cooperate with anti-governmental movements in the process of the
regime change. As a result, core members of the party were expelled from the
political scene after president Ben AH went into exile.. In Egypt, like Tunisia,
the governmental party was dismantled after president Mubarak resigned. The
military supreme board held governmental power because the ligyptian military..
which rejected Mubarak's order to suppress demonstrations, won the con丘dence
of the opposition groups and the people.
